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As Japan and the Nordic countries entered the final decade of the 20th century, they experienced an
abrupt end to a near decade-long rapid surge in asset prices. An era of economic optimism was
transformed into recession and a difficult cleaning-up process of the financial sector started.
Although different in volume, the banking crises of Japan and the Nordic countries show close
similarities in character and timing. Also the institutional setting was similar, where extensive
regulations was the order of the day.
However, the Japanese response to the crisis was slow. Not until April 1998 did a liberalization
package of the Japanese financial markets, called "Tokyo Big Bang", came into force. By that time, the
Swedish and the Finnish financial crises were by and large solved and a new industrial structure had
emerged, replacing the old one.
Drawing from the Swedish and the Finnish experiences, a successful solution to the Japanese financial
crisis necessitates radical measures by wiping away the whole stock of bad loans and raise efficiency
on the financial markets and within financial firms. This might imply even more thorough restructuring
than it was originally intended from the Japanese side. What factors made the restructuring of the
Swedish and the Finnish financial markets faster than the Japanese one? Given the reforms so far, can
Japan resolve its problems in the financial sector in reasonable time and eventually catch up with
European and North American financial markets?
The conclusions are that it is too late for Japan to simply emulate the Nordic model. Rather, reforms
encompassing the whole Japanese economy are necessary in order to win back the confidence of the
Japanese people.
In this paper, the Japanese financial reforms will be compared to the Swedish and the Finnish
experiences, focusing on the evolution of the banking crises and the government response to these
crises. Furthermore, the subsequent changes in the industrial structure and regulatory institutions are
also addressed. Finally, the usefulness of implementing a Nordic style banking sector restructuring in
Japan is discussed.
Keywords: Bad Loans, Banking Crisis, Deregulation, Financial Reform, Finland,
Japan, Sweden.
* The author is obliged to the commentators at the AICS 2 conference in Berlin on 10 August 2001
for valuable comments.2
1. Introduction
During the 1990’s, Japan suffered from a deep recession resulting from the failure of
the Japanese stock exchanges and the subsequent crash on the real estate markets in
the end of 1980’s. The actors in the Japanese financial sector, which were hit
exceptionally hard by the sudden real estate revaluation and the drop in the number of
deals, tried to find other markets in order to compensate the downfall in the Japanese
economy. The South East Asian market, which still cried for foreign capital, then
became the new business opportunity for the Japanese banks in order to recoup some
of the losses made at home.
In 1997, the Japanese financial world experienced the worst crisis since the end of
WW2. Even before the Asian Crisis in July of that year, the improvement of the
Japanese economy was hampered by stiffened fiscal policies of the Hashimoto
government. The low level of consumption became even lower after the increase of
consumption taxes to 5%, followed by a decrease in the industrial production level,
which in turn triggered another large-scale fall in stock prices. Although not the direct
cause to the bad loan crisis in Japan, the Asian Crisis thus became a catalyst in
making a serious financial situation unsustainable. In connection with this crisis,
serious financial misconducts such as so-called tobashi
1 were revealed. Ultimately,
the credit losses from the operations both in Japan and South East Asia could not be
hidden anymore and resulted in the first of mega-failures affecting the Japanese
financial sector
2. The trust in the Japanese financial sector was severely damaged.
However, the Hashimoto coalition government had by that time also identified the
need for structural reforms in the Japanese financial sector. In 1996, the then Prime
Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto announced “the Tokyo Big Bang”, which was a
thorough reform package affecting both the financial industry and the legislation
regulating the industry. The Asian Crisis just coincided with the reform plans and
only made the necessity for urgent, non-cosmetic reforms even more acute.
As a phenomenon, there is nothing new about banking crises. They tend to surface
from time to time, and seem to be an unavoidable part of a market economy system.
                                                
1 See chapter 3 for explanation of tobashi.3
During the 20
th century, more than one hundred countries under various
macroeconomic regimes have experienced banking crises of different scale
3. The
causes have been varying, and to group all these crises together in order to extract a
single universal cause would not be particularly rewarding.
Did the Japanese financial crisis have a totally unique pattern? To some extent this
might be true, in the sense that a major regional crisis being the trigger to a long due
large-scale crisis in the financial sector of the world’s second largest economy. On the
other hand, the similarities to other contemporary crises are striking.
Despite having liberalized their banking sectors before their crises, the process in
Sweden and Finland at the turn of 1989-1990 leading to their financial debacles is
very similar to the situation in Japan. Sweden and Finland also experienced a sudden
and drastic fall in asset prices, and a dramatic surge in bad loan volume as a result of a
collapse of an overheated economy. Therefore, it is interesting to compare the
development of these crises and see how the Swedish and Finnish governments
responded to their crises respectively, and how the Japanese government has managed
the financial crisis so far.
Each Nordic country, except for Iceland, suffered large-scale drops in asset values
after several years of speculation leading to overpricing. In this paper, I will limit the
study to look at the banking crises from a formal institutional perspective, since
explanations to the crises and the following restructuring from the perspective of
informal institutions, such as cultural norms, will force the analysis out of the scope
and intention of this paper. Furthermore, it will mainly address the problems of the
banking institutions of Sweden, Finland and Japan. In the first part, I will give a
background to the situation before and during the crises, then describe the measures
that were taken by the Swedish and Finnish authorities and compare them to what the
Japanese authorities have done so far. Furthermore, achieved results from these
measures will be assessed. A discussion whether the Nordic experiences can
contribute or not to the situation in Japan will conclude the paper.
                                                                                                                                           
2 The Japanese financial world had already in 1995 and 1996 experienced seven bankruptcies of the so-
called Jusen housing loan corporations; however, these were not comparable in volume to the defaults
in 1997 (see also page 16).
3 Englund, p. 80.4
2. The structure of the financial sectors before the crisis
2.1 The structure of the Swedish financial sector
Though the actual institutions were founded at different time periods, the structure of
the financial sector in Sweden and Finland were very similar to the one in Japan and
wore very much the same features. As in Japan, many of the financial institution as
they existed at the turn of 1980’s were children of the old-time and strict regulatory
regime
4.
Sweden had at the turn of 1980’s one of the most heavily regulated financial sectors
within the OECD. The industry was dominated by a small number of banks,
practically dividing the banking market between them: the commercial banks turned
to corporate and urban households sectors, while the savings and cooperative banks
were concentrating on smaller firms and households in smaller cities and rural areas.
Besides interest rate regulations, following features were prominent in the Swedish
regulatory system
5:
•  Ceilings on the rate of private sector bonds issues
•  Rules limiting stockholding by foreign citizens
•  Requirements on Swedish banks to buy government and housing bonds
•  Control of foreign exchange
•  Limitations on foreign citizens buying interest-bearing assets denominated in
Swedish kronor
•  Prohibition on foreign banks opening subsidiaries or to start retail business
These regulations allowed the authorities to control the in- and outflow of capital, and
in doing so, helped the government to pursue the fiscal policy. The Bank of Sweden
also relied on quantitative limits on loans to banks and moral suasion to control the
credit level in the banking system
6. These regulations eventually led to a “main bank”
system, with very close links between the major Swedish exporters and the large
commercial banks. But the incentives to stick to such “main bank” relation was
                                                
4 One of the oldest regulations was the upper limit on interest rates, which was regulated by law since
18
th century. This law also applied to Finland as well, since it was then a part of Sweden.
5 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 10.
6 Ibid., p. 5.5
significant as changing banks was associated with very high transaction costs, both in
informal and formal terms. On the other hand, this lowered the firms’ uncertainty and
the main banks’ information costs.
Even though the regulations were extensive, the banks found means to invent new
business forms in order to avoid them. The main idea behind the introduction of these
non-bank financial institutions was primarily to open up new businesses and adapt to
the changing market conditions along the evolution of time
7. In other words, many of
these non-bank financial institutions were founded as a way to circumvent
government regulations – which was silently accepted by the government in order to
secure a smooth-running financial system.
However, first in 1987, the director of the Bank of Sweden, Bengt Dennis, marked in
a speech that the role of the central bank as a regulating authority had long since been
bypassed by the different measures Swedish banks had taken to escape the
regulations. It is less likely that the Swedish central bank had understood the facts of
the reality as late as in the end of the 1980’s, but the authorities did at last publicly
admit that the effectiveness of the regulatory system belonged to bygone days.
By the time of the speech of the Bank of Sweden director, the liberalization process
had actually been going on since the beginning of the 1980's. The Swedish
government had started on a limited scale in 1978 by abolishing the ceilings on bank
deposit interest rates
8. By 1990, all the regulations listed above were lifted, and the
freedom of capital movement was complete.
2.2 The structure of the Finnish financial sector
Similar to Sweden, Finland has also a history of heavily regulated financial sector. In
fact, the tradition of financial regulation in Finland stems from the Swedish rule of the
country
9. Like Sweden, the Finnish authorities made a significant effort to control the
financial sector up until the 1980’s. Haavisto (1992) mentions for example a number
of agreements, where the major banks were invited to conferences by the Finnish
                                                
7 Larsson, p. 47.
8 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 10.
9 Haavisto, p. 19.6
central bank in order to agree on a common interest rate for all banks
10. In addition,
each commercial bank was assigned a quota on advances from the central bank. By
doing so, the Bank of Finland could effectively control the level of credits as the
commercial banks relied heavily on marginal loans from the central bank
11.
Apart from the interest rates, the foreign exchange control and the prohibition on
establishing subsidiaries for foreign banks were other targets of the regulation. In
addition, non-commercial banks were discriminated in their dealings with the Bank of
Finland. The secondary markets for bonds and equity were before the deregulation
very small and insignificant, and bank borrowing was the primary capital source for
corporations and households
12.
Another area that was strictly regulated was the foreign exchange. Going from being
unregulated before the Second World War, the post-war foreign exchange regulation
was used as a tool to cope with the chronic balance of trade problems following the
post-war conditions and reconstruction
13.
The process towards deregulation started in 1983, which was somewhat later than in
Sweden. By 1991, however, virtually all regulated areas were liberalized and Finland
was on par with Sweden
14. To start with, areas of lesser importance were liberalized
by, for example, allowing foreign banks to set up subsidiaries and domestic banks to
lend abroad. During the latter half of the decade the most important regulations, such
as the regulations on interest rates and the prohibition of floating interest rates on all
forms of loans, were abolished as well as restrictions for individuals and corporations
to raise loans denominated in foreign currency.
By the time the crisis emerged, the conditions for doing financial business in Finland
was therefore completely changed compared to the conditions a few years earlier.
                                                
10 Ibid., pp. 25-30.
11 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 5.
12 Haavisto, p.25.
13 Ibid., p. 32.
14 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 11.7
2.3 The structure of the Japanese financial sector
The roots to the industrial structure before the “Big Bang” of 1998 lay in the pre-war
societal structure. In an attempt to enhance the country’s economic ability to support
the expansionistic policies of Meiji, Taisho and early Showa eras, the financial
industry was strictly sectioned off in order to let each subsector become specialized in
its designated area. Cargill (2000) has pointed out five characteristics of the Japanese
financial industry that were established well before the start of the Second World
War
15:
•  Virtually no direct financing through capital markets
•  Large cartels of banks, promoting long-term relationships with nonfinancial firms
and restricting competition
•  Large number of small and poorly capitalized banks
•  Government financial intermediation, especially through postal savings, to finance
various projects became increasingly important
•  The central bank being de facto an extension of the Ministry of Finance
It is interesting to note that despite the financial crisis of 1927 and defeat in the
Second World War, this structure survived and was in fact regarded and used as an
important factor for supporting the post-war recovery of the Japanese industry, much
because of the shortage of capital. Besides a desire to reduce risks and uncertainty of
investments, the aim was to allocate resources with the help from heavy financial
regulations to those industrial sectors that were designated for development by the
government. On the other hand, this also meant costs to society in the form of raised
entry costs for outsiders and reduced competition in banking.
As in Sweden and Finland, the structure of low competition and similar setting of
prices and interest rates seems to have fostered close bank-customer relationship. But
unlike the Nordic countries, the Japanese banks also had extensive stock holdings in
the companies they financed.
Primarily due to the record growth of the Japanese economy, these drawbacks of the
regulatory system were not apparent enough in an atmosphere of high investment rate,
                                                
15 Cargill, p. 2.8
increasing exports and growing domestic consumption. One might say that the
welfare loss in sustaining this structure was offset by the general performance of the
Japanese economy.
Deregulations were not completely absent before the 1998 "Big Bang" however. After
the first oil crisis in the 1970’s, the first steps were taken towards liberalization. The
major reason for these early reforms was more structural than an aspiration for
efficiency, in the sense that it was initiated by the Ministry of Finance in order to
internationalize the yen. An amendment to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade
Control Law of 1947 was passed by the Diet in 1980, making it the first reform of any
major significance. By the end of the decade, the euroyen and yen-dominated foreign
bond markets were liberalized, and an offshore market for yen was established in
Tokyo after further amendments to the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control
Law. Closely connected to this reform, the interest rates were also deregulated. In
1979, CD was introduced, followed by a liberalization of time-deposits rates. By
1994, this process was concluded by the liberalization of the interest rates for all
liquid accounts, except for checking accounts.
Here, a few words on the liberalization of short-term foreign borrowing are necessary.
In mid-1980’s this was set free, leading to a sudden increase in short-term borrowing
by Japanese corporations and banks, and in length, contributed to the liquidity
overflow in Japan. Meanwhile, long-term borrowing abroad was still restricted by the
existing regulation. Although not being the only source of funds for the Japanese
“bubble”-time speculation, short-term foreign loans were a significant contributor to
the defaults when it was converted to long-term domestic loans.
Despite all this, Japan remained financially one of the most rigidly regulated countries
in the industrialized world
16. Much of the banking structure was identical to the one
half a century earlier, and like e.g. Sweden, Finland and Germany, financing through
banks, often through several intermediaries, rather than through capital markets was
prevalent. In addition, the power of the Ministry of Finance as regulator and
supervisor was still absolute, and often exercised its power by moral suasion.
                                                
16 Ibid., p. 5.9
Figure 1. Foreign and domestic liabilities vs. Japanese foreign investments during the 1980’s.
Values indiced. (Data source: IMF)
Practices such as the so-called “convoy” system, where strong banks rescued ailing
financial institutions by the order of the ministry, was the order of the day.
3. The financial crises
3.1 The Swedish financial crisis
A popular explanation to the financial crisis in Sweden at the time was that the crisis
was caused by the financial liberalization during the 1980's
17. Two factors in
particular were pinpointed as a direct cause of the crisis. One factor was the complete
removal of limits in lending in 1985. Similar to Finland and Japan, Swedish banking
was a mature business, protected from international competition. One of the few ways
to grow in such an environment at the time was through credit expansion, which
suddenly exploded as a result of this deregulation. The second factor was the
liberalization of capital movements in 1989, which made it possible for investors to
buy assets in more high-yielding locations such as London and Brussels, thus leading
to a pressure on real estate prices.
                                                
17 E.g. see Afrell and Sundqvist (1992).10
It is worthwhile to take a closer look at the pattern of the credit expansion in Sweden.
After the removal of the limit on credit expansion, most banks identified this
deregulation as an opportunity to rapidly increase market share in an industry where
the average of market share growth during fortunate years was at most 1% annually.
The head offices of the largest banks (with the exception for Svenska Handelsbanken)
encouraged local branches to expand their stock of loans to both commercial and
private borrowers in order to increase the bank’s loan market share. Some banks even
had bonus incentives for managers at local branches if they increased the amount of
lending. This hardly encouraged careful risk assessment of borrowers, but rather
increased the risk taking from the banks’ point of view. On top of the credit expansion
that local branches were responsible for, the headquaters of the banks were also
generous lenders and lent out money to dubious prestige projects such as investments
in real estate in the United States.
Eventually, the loans amounted to 50% of the GDP in 1993, of which 22% constituted
of bad loans. Of these, 50% was related to losses from real estate investments (in the
peak year of 1990, this figure amounted to 75%). The major part of the credit losses
(77%) was related to loans to the non-financial corporate sector, whereas the
households’ share of bad loans only was 20%
18. Thus, in Sweden, the banking crisis
was triggered by the sudden burst of the real estate and land price bubble.
The situation thus became unsustainable in 1992. As a result of the crises in the asset
markets in the previous years, the volume of bad loans increased dramatically. In
addition, the currency crisis during the fall of 1992 put many domestic firms without
own earnings in foreign currency in a hopeless position
19. As the time passed by, it
was more and more obvious that some banks were on the brink of bankruptcy because
of defaulting borrowers.
3.2 The Finnish financial crisis
Apart from the crises in Japan and Sweden, the Finnish case shows some particular
features. Being a small open country and a net borrower, the economy of Finland was,
                                                
18 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 23.
19 According to Drees and Pazarbasioglu (1998), half of the foreign currency loans had been extended
to domestic firms in the non-tradable sector.11
similarly to the Swedish one, dependent on the situation on the international financial
markets. The bad loan problems experienced by Finland were by and large founded in
loans denominated in foreign currency
20. Also the stock of loans to private
households, denominated in local currency, were a source of anxiety for the Finnish
banks
21.
The lack of competition in the banking sector
22 had led to, again like in Sweden, a
competition strategy of gaining market share by establishing an extensive network of
branches throughout the country and by differentiating the quality of services
offered
23.
Naturally, the private sector's behaviour changed after the liberalization of credits. As
the liberalization occurred during a time of high growth, both firms and households
increased their loans rapidly. This process was strengthened by two rather unfortunate
circumstances: generous criteria for tax deduction of interest payments and freedom
for all to obtain loans denominated in foreign currency. Since the inflation was
relatively high and the exchange rate was fixed (the same conditions applied to
Sweden as well), the result was very cheap loans for borrowers. Even though the
monetary policy turned more restrictive in 1989, the loans were in real terms still
cheap. Only after the drastic measures taken by the Bank of Finland in connection
with the currency crises of 1991 and 1992, the real interest rates turned positive.
During the 1980’s, the credit expanded dramatically, and from being about 50% of
GDP in 1983 when the deregulation process started, the ratio of bank loans to GDP
was nearly 100% at the peak year 1990
24. Thus, the increase was even more dramatic
than in Sweden, and the liberalization resulted in a loan-financed consumption and
investments pattern in these two countries
25.
In 1989, the first signs of a financial crisis emerged. After a decade of high economic
growth in the country and high bank profitability, the economy had started to weaken
                                                
20 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 1.
21 Ibid., p. 1.
22 Only two major banks, Kansallis Osake Pankki and the Union Bank of Finland, dominated the
market.
23 Vihriälä, p.31.
24 Drees and Pazarbasioglu, p. 13.
25 Ibid., p. 12.12
owing to higher short-term interest rates and the consequent decline in asset prices
and slowdown of the earlier rapid credit expansion
26. Sustained by the generous
lending, asset prices had by that time raised dramatically compared to the situation
before the financial liberalization, and the fixed exchange rate made capital import an
attractive option for investors
27. All of a sudden, a sharp revaluation of market prices
brought about an immediate debt crisis.
In addition, the sudden disappearance of the important Comecon trade meant a
considerable external shock that severely hampered the Finnish economy, which
depended to a large extent on exports and imports from the Eastern Bloc
28. Finally,
the currency crises in 1991 and 1992, which hit the currencies of Sweden, Finland and
Norway particularly hard, acted as a coup de grace for the system, due to the large
amount of loans denominated in foreign currency.
All these factors combined made the Finnish banks suddenly exposed with a large
stock of loans for which it was highly uncertain whether the borrowers could repay. In
1991, the situation had deteriorated enough to seriously threaten the solvency of the
whole Finnish financial system.
3.3 The Japanese financial crisis
In 1982, the Topix index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange skyrocketed suddenly after
having a relatively stable and modest development. In a mere eight years, the index
increased by 564% before it collapsed in January 1990
29. At the same time, the asset
prices also increased rapidly, and for the real estate market, the urban areas of the
major cities experienced an unprecedented increase in land price. Japan had at that
time enjoyed a long period of high economic activity, and the domestic economy was
expanding quickly, sustained by a high domestic consumption. The trade and current
account surpluses in combination with Bank of Japan's expansionist monetary policy
led to an overheated economy and an accumulation of surplus funds. In other words,
the financial institutions experienced a literal money overflow.
                                                
26 Vihriälä, p. 37.
27 Nyberg, p. 116.
28 Honkapohja et al., p. 38.
29 Tokyo Stock Exchange (1995).13
As observed in the cases of Sweden and Finland, the Japanese banks also expanded
credits in order to gain market share and the credit to firms and consumers tripled
between 1986 and 1989
30. The private financial institutions were largely responsible
for the major part of this credit expansion and the governmental financial institutions'
share of the total credits was relatively low. Banks actively encouraged both firms and
individuals to borrow money for various purposes, and were less careful in judging
whether they were in need of the money or were solvent. Incentives for doing careful
assessments were low, since the value of the securities for loans, which typically was
real estate, increased constantly. Therefore, the process became self-amplifying as
new loans were granted on the basis on already over-valued assets.
The Bank of Japan did observe the development in 1987, and identified it as a
speculative bubble. Furthermore, the central bank did warn about the consequences
this speculative behavior, which fuelled the asset price bubble
31. Two years later, in
the Chosa Geppo no. 5/89, the central bank continued to warn about the development
in similar wording as in 1987. Also the Ministry of Finance did express its worries
about the situation in its white books of 1989 and 1991
32. The supervising authorities
were in all probability aware of the situation, and did understand the causes behind its
development.
However, the concerns about a possible recession following the Plaza accord in 1985
might have made the government hesitant to implement stricter monetary policy. The
stock market crashes in 1987 and 1989 also influenced the Bank of Japan’s (and
indirectly also the Ministry of Finance) lenient stance since it feared that a tightening
of the monetary policy would have negative effect on the asset prices
33.
1990 is widely recognized as the year when the “bubble” burst in Japan. At first, it
seemed as Japan could by the sheer size of its economy survive the crash in the asset
markets, and many observers pointed at earlier experiences such as the two oil shocks,
when the Japanese firms eventually emerged from the crises stronger than ever. But
the recession dragged on, and in 1998 the country even experienced negative growth
                                                
30 Okumura, p. 129.
31 Bank of Japan, Chosa Geppo no. 5/87.
32 Okumura, p. 141.
33 Ozawa, p. 356.14
for the first time since 1973
34. More and more, it was obvious that the days of high
GDP growth rates were past and could now be compared to those of the European
countries. As the record-long recession continued, phenomena that Japan had not
experienced for years started to appear: large-scale dismissal of white-collar workers,
university graduates having difficulties in finding an employment upon graduation,
collapse in the domestic consumption and failure of financial institutions.
In order to improve the efficiency of the financial markets, the Hashimoto coalition
government announced in 1996 a multiple step programme of financial deregulation
called the “Tokyo Big Bang”. The deregulation plan called for a wide-range reform of
the industrial structure by an introduction of a whole new institutional framework. In
principle, all types of financial services were now open for every firm with
concession, as well as a complete freedom of capital movement. In addition, a new
supervising authority, the Financial Supervisory Agency (FSA)
35, was set up. Starting
in 1998, the “Big Bang” scheme was to be implemented by the end of the fiscal year
2001. The aim for this liberalization was to:
•  Prevent the hollowing out of Japan’s financial markets
•  Enhance the international competitiveness of Japan’s financial intermediaries
•  Enhance the status of the yen as an international currency
•  Smooth the flow of funds to indigenous growth industries
•  Increase “efficiency” of the market, that is, to adopt a free market principle
•  Increase transparency and reliability of markets
•  Maximise “user” benefits in the form of investment returns, freedom of choice
of financial products etc.
However, a year before this ambitious plan was set afloat, the Asian Crisis occurred.
To the surprise of many, this crisis affected Japan in an unexpected manner.
Suddenly, even large financial institutions announced financial difficulties, which was
a phenomenon that earlier during the 1990's happened only to smaller financial firms
with relatively small capital bases such as Jusen housing loan companies.
                                                
34 OECD Statistical Compendium, ed. 1#2000.
35 The current name is Financial Services Agency.15
Soon after the fiscal tightening made by the Hashimoto government during the spring
of 1997 and the subsequent decrease in consumer demand and stock prices (which
were already on low levels since burst of the “bubble” in 1990-1991), the Asian Crisis
occurred. The effects of it on the Japanese financial world were devastating. To many
Japanese financial actors' dismay, the crisis was a final blow that put their firms in a
very bad state; the credit losses and bad loans from the 1980's could not be hidden
anymore, and it was evident to everyone that the stability of the Japanese financial
system itself was threatened by the long-time neglect of the problems. It was revealed
that many of the large financial institutions practiced advanced bookkeeping within
the legal boundaries in order to wait out the economic recession that hit Japan after
1990. Since the turn of the 1990's, there were mergers between principally small
regional banks, saving associations and saving unions had occurred in order to
strengthen their books. The major banks, however, pursued another strategy by
turning to the Asian loan market, where foreign capital still was in large demand, in
an attempt to recoup some of the losses made on the domestic market.
After the crisis of the minor financial institutions
36 in 1995 and 1996, the banking
crisis in Japan culminated in 1997 and 1998 when several large financial institutions
such as Hokkaido Takushoku Ginko and Yamaichi Securities went bankrupt. During
the same period, it was also revealed that Nippon Credit Bank (NCB) was overloaded
with bad loans. The picture of the financial situation of the banks was scewed by the
fact that the Japanese accounting laws permitted them to state the value of the stocks
on their balance sheets to the market value when they were purchased, not to the
current value. Furthermore, it was not necessary under Japanese accounting laws to
present consolidated accounts in the annual reports. As a result of this, it was revealed
in 1997 that these firms exercised so-called tobashi during the 1990’s, which was a
practice to "export" credit losses and bad loans to subsidiaries registered in foreign
countries in order to clean up the books of the parent company. These factors made
the banks look healthier than they really were, and were made possible because of the
comparatively lax Japanese accounting laws
37.
                                                
36 I.e. Jusen house loan firms, small regional banks, saving associations and saving unions.
37 For example, the legislation regarding consolidated accounting in Sweden was enforced already in
1930's after the crash of Ivar Kruger's Swedish Match industrial empire, which used similar practices as
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Figure 2. Profit before tax for the Japanese city banks 1980 – 1997.  (Data source: OECD)
Close relations with firms under the keiretsu umbrella in combination with large stock
holdings in these firms caused further problems to the banks. As long as these bank
group companies performed well in the seemingly ever-expanding Japanese economy,
this was not a problem. However, problems with this system became apparent in the
1990’s. In their paper, Morck and Nakamura (1999) found that the bank groups
tended to differentiate their keiretsu companies from non-keiretsu companies. In the
former case, banks act primarily in the short-term interest as creditors, while in the
latter case, the banks acted in the broader interest of a range of stakeholders. This
included the banks themselves, not only as lenders but also as stockholders. Under the
pre-Big Bang period, ordinary banks were forbidden to deal in stocks and other forms
of securities except for portfolio investments for the bank’s own account. The
authors’ hypothesis was that the “house banks” could “prop up” keiretsu group
companies in distress instead of letting them go bankrupt, leading to the survival of
inefficient companies. In other words, here is an incentive problem and a loss to the
society present due to an institutional structure. According to Morck’s and
Nakamura’s findings, the banks were indeed “propping up” its keiretsu firms.
The impression of a profound crisis among the Japanese public was strengthened even
more during these years due to the revelation of several scandals at a high level,17
which demonstrated the nature of the close social networks between supervising
officials and managers of the financial institutions. Thus, the pressure on the
politicians increased as the public support for faster reforms grew.
Eventually, many financial institutions, of which the Long Term Credit Bank of Japan
(LTCB), NCB, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank and Yamaichi Securities were the most
well known, were forced to reveal their huge losses and cease operations. Previously
between May 1995 and December 1997, 11 institutions had gone bankrupt with total
losses of JPY 2.2 trillion (about US$18.2 billion in 1997 average exchange rate). In
addition, examples of bad corporate governance were revealed, such as Sumitomo’s
and Daiwa bank’s attempts to hide their speculation losses
38. In connection with the
Yamaichi failure, the weaknesses of the accounting practices also became apparent
since Chuo Audit, who were responsible for the external audition of the brokerage
firm, whose chief auditor reportedly audited Yamaichi for 35 years, failed to detect
off-book losses of JPY 274 billion (about US$ 2.6 billion
39) and signed off the annual
report of Yamaichi just months before its huge bankruptcy
40.
4. The aftermath of the crises
Sweden and Finland experienced a profound drop in economic activity as their
“bubble” burst. The stock and real estate markets crumbled as well as private
consumption
41.
The Swedish government was eventually forced in September 1992 to give a general
guarantee for all deposits in the whole banking sector, as opposed to their original
case-by-case treatment. The level of the commitment was at the time equal to 6% of
the GDP
42. Later the same year, the Swedish parliament approved a proposal from the
government to form the Bank Support Authority. The support scheme involved all
banks that had permission to conduct banking business in Sweden, including the non-
bank financial institutions owned by these banks
43. Of the Swedish banks, the
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commercial banks Nordbanken and Gotabanken were in the worst shape. Typically
enough, these banks were the most aggressive actors on the credit market during the
1980’s, and suffered the greatest losses of all banks relative to its capital base. Despite
desperate measures made by the government (who well before the crisis was the
largest shareholder of Nordbanken) to save Nordbanken, it was apparent in early 1992
that the bank was about to go bankrupt before the end of the year. Gotabanken was
also in a similar situation, and the government eventually seized control over both
banks as a part of the bank support
44. Under the guidance of the government, the
banks merged to a new Nordbanken. In addition, two asset-management institutions,
Securum and Retriva, were also formed to take care of the claims with worst
perspectives for Nordbanken and Gotabanken, respectively. In 1995, Securum
acquired Retriva, and in 1997, Securum was purchased by a state-owned company
and had by then finished the job it was set to do. Other banks followed the example
and set up their own asset-management firms.
In total, five banks actively applied for funds from the government. Apart from the
two commercial banks Nordbanken and Gotabanken (which were recipients of 98%
of the government support
45), three of the largest banks, Skandinaviska Enskilda
Banken, Sparbanken and Föreningssparbanken also applied for support. A sixth,
Svenska Handelsbanken, considered an application but eventually disbanded the idea.
Of the total commitment of SEK 88 billion (US$ 12.34 billion
46), only 65 billion
(US$ 9.11 billion) was used, much owing to the fact that neither of the two largest
commercial banks, Skandinaviska Enskilda Banken and Svenska Handelsbanken,
were in need of government support and the asset-management firms of these banks
were, like Securum, very successful in liquidating their assets.
The Finnish government was forced to take similar steps as in Sweden, but the actual
approach was somewhat different. The Bank of Finland took extraordinary measures
in saving the SKOPbank in September 1991
47, but this was just a panic move. The
year after, the crisis had grown even more and the Government Guarantee Fund
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(GGF) was thereby formed. In addition, the Finnish government also chose to support
the ailing banks directly from the state budget.
In the beginning, the government support to the banking sector was insufficient. The
Bank of Finland stepped in only in the SKOPbank case, but soon it was apparent that
many other banks were financially distressed. Still, the government did not give GGF
adequate resources; it did not even have its own full-time employees
48. In 1993, the
situation improved when GGF got a new organizational structure and was reporting
directly to the government, which in turn decided to which institution to give support.
During the same year, the structure of the financial supervision improved when the
Banking Supervision Office, which had until then been a part of the Ministry of
Finance, became an independent part of the Bank of Finland under the name of
Financial Supervision Authority.
The banking crisis in Finland hit in particular the savings banks. Many had stakes in
SKOPbank, but they were also engaged heavily in aggressive lending themselves
during the 1980’s. In the case of the SKOPbank, two asset-management companies
were formed by the Bank of Finland, where one acquired SKOP’s industrial holdings
and the other the real estate holdings of SKOP. In 1992, GGF acquired the bank
operations of SKOP from the Bank of Finland, while the two asset-management
companies remained under the central bank
49. Later, GGF sold in their turn the two
asset-management companies to the Swedish commercial bank Svenska
Handelsbanken.
For the savings banks, the process was even more drastic. Due to a mutual solvency
scheme, which connected many savings banks, a total of 41 banks were merged into
the Savings Bank of Finland under the ownership of the GGF
50. The following year,
the Savings Bank of Finland was sold in equal parts to the Kansallis Osake Pankki
(KOP), the Union Bank of Finland, the Postbank and the cooperative banks
respectively, and was sold again for the third time in 1994 to the asset-management
company of the Savings Bank of Finland called Arsenal. Arsenal acquired at the same
time the remaining assets from the GGF that not had been part of the 1993 sale.
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Before the banking crisis in Finland was settled however, a third rescue operation was
necessary. The format was the same as in the case of SKOPbank and the Savings
Bank of Finland. Like other savings banks, the Suomen Työväen Säästöpankki (STS)
was engaged in aggressive lending and was close to bankruptcy in 1992. The original
plan was to merge STS with KOP, and transfer the bad loans to an asset-management
company. However, the Finnish parliament hindered the plan to set up an asset-
management company by voting against the government proposal, effectively
postponing the reconstruction of STS. The problems with STS were finally solved in
1993, where the bank merged with KOP and the “old” STS bank was transformed into
an asset-management company
51.
In addition, the Finnish government offered in 1992 a FIM 7.9 billion (US$ 1.76
billion
52) capital injection to the banking sector as a credit crunch threatened. This
offer was accepted by all banks, and the capital injection was in practice a preferential
loan as the interest rate of it was only slightly over the market rates. The catch was a
threat of government takeover if the accepting banks’ equity ratio fell under a certain
level or the bank defaulted in interest payments.
By 1996, the total public cost of the banking crisis was FIM 88.6 billion (US$ 19.29
billion
53), that is, the banking crisis being far more expensive for Finland than for
Sweden.
The crisis meant also great structural upheavals in the banking sectors for both
Sweden and Finland. In Sweden, a number of banks merged during the first five years
following the banking crisis, and new, smaller banks emerged. In Finland, the savings
banks disappeared in large numbers and the number of actors in the banking market
was concentrated to the four major banking groups mentioned above. Mergers were
also taking place, notably the one between Unitas bank and KOP, forming Merita
Bank (which later merged with the Swedish Nordbanken).
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Figure 3. Profit before tax (in % of average total assets) for commercial and savings banks 1980
– 1995. (Data source: OECD)
However, both Sweden and Finland managed to rise from the ashes in relatively short
time. Thanks to a well-organized government action, the bad loans could be
eliminated parallel to the measures taken against the severe recession. Already in
1993, the trend of negative or zero GDP growth was broken, and the management of
the credit losses and the bad loans were handed over to institutions specially set up for
this purpose. By 1994 (for Sweden) and 1996 (for Finland), the bad loans were
written off and having got rid of all bad loans, the banks increased their profitability
dramatically and went out of the crisis stronger than ever.
In Japan, the bad loans from the “bubble” era still linger, and it is still uncertain how
large the stock of bad loans really is. In 1998, OECD made an estimation of one
quadrillion yen (over US$ 7.4 trillion, calculated by the average exchange rate of the
“bubble” peak year 1991), which represented over 14 per cent of the value of the total
assets in Japan at the end of 1989
54. Anderson and Campbell (2000) cite a NBER
report, estimating the bad loans in the Japanese banking sector to be 7% of the GDP
in 1998
55. Analysts cited in Financial Times of June 19, 2001, estimate the bad loans
that still linger to be worth between JPY 40 and 70 trillion (US$ 328 ~ 574 billion), or
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8 to 13% of the GDP in 2000. The figures of 2002 are still unknown, but for the major
city banks, the stock of bad loans has increased even further by 74% from 2001 to
2002
56. Thus, the seriousness of the bad loans problem is very hard to calculate, and
the only thing that is certain is that the total amount is substantial even for a huge
economy such as Japan’s.
The most prominent effort so far to reconstructing the banking system is the 1998
“Big Bang “ reform plan. Although ambitious, it only spells out broad-ranged
deregulations and reforms, and does not explicitly addresses the issue of bad loans.
Before the “Big Bang” reform, the Japanese government did address the bad loans
only a couple of times, most prominently through the measures taken in 1996 and
1998, aiming for stabilization of the financial system by make limited injection of
public funds into the financial system possible. After the introduction of the “Big
Bang” reforms, the Financial Revitalization Law was passed through the parliament in
October 1998, which allowed even larger injection of public funds into the financial
system. In relation to the number of the bad loans, the result was however doubtful
and the government failed again in reviving the financial sector, and in length, the
Japanese economy.
The Japanese government’s failure to clean up the post-bubble mess can therefore be
attributed to the lack of coherency in its economic policy and to the inability to
simultaneously address the recession and the financial crisis in a Nordic manner. The
closest Japan has come a government-led bank restructuring of the Nordic type so far
is in the cases of LTCB and NCB. The bankruptcy of these banks, both nationalized
in 1998, was handled on case-by-case basis by a new authority, the Financial Reform
Commission (FRC). In addition to the JPY 17 trillion (US$ 143.5 billion) the
Japanese government has used to clean up the books of the nationalized banks, a
general capital injection of JPY 7,5 trillion (US$ 63.3 billion) was made from public
funds to the banking sector in 1999. The remains of LTCB and NCB were later sold
in separate deals, brokered by non-Japanese consultancy firms (quite unthinkable only
a few years ago), but have brought back only a fraction of what the government has
spent on the banks.
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The case of NCB is interesting as an illustration of the Japanese banks' approach to
the bad loan problem. Until 1997, NCB would have never admitted any problems
with their loans. Suddenly, the bank announced that it was in immediate need of new
capital injection, and the Ministry of Finance called on the Tokyo-Mitsubishi Bank
and the Industrial Bank of Japan to assist NCB under the "convoy" system
57. Despite
these efforts, the situation for NCB deteriorated further and finally in 1998, there was
no option but to nationalize it in order to rescue the bank after pressure from the
newly independent FSA
58. NCB first estimated in 1999 that the bad loans constituted
40% of the loans, only to revise the figure the year after, when more loans were
classified as bad according to the new rules of loan classification
59. In this connection,
the action of the opposition parties in the Japanese parliament have to be considered.
Since the nationalization and the subsequent sale of LTBC and NCB, furious
discussions have taken place in the parliament. In August 2000, the sale of NCB was
postponed a month because of political discussion between the LDP coalition
government and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ), where DPJ accused the FRC of
being too generous in the terms of sale. The same kind of intense political discussions
has also surrounded the sale of LTCB.
The FSA, which was a bureau under the Ministry of Finance, was made an
independent government agency in 1998 and has so far, except from minor cases in
the very beginning of its existence, taken up a rather tough stance versus the banks.
Among the measures it has taken is to force banks to fully reveal their bad loans. It
has also shown an unusual speed in handling its administration, which is shown e.g. in
the case of the Mitsui Trust and Chuo Trust merger.
Since 1998, the banking sector has gone through profound structural changes. Four
major mergers have been announced, and two new smaller banks, the Sony Bank and
IY Bank, had opened business. Several more are in process for approval by FSA.
So far, the efforts made by the Japanese government through the FRC
60 and the FSA
have led to two bank take-overs and four closures of regional banks. The government
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has also spent a tremendous amount of public money in various forms of capital
injection. The final accounts of the Japanese banking crisis cannot yet be settled
however, as the full width of the bad loans is still unknown.
During 2001, the signs of deflation became more and more apparent. There is now a
significant pressure on the Japanese government and the Bank of Japan to take
measures against the deteriorating macroeconomic performance. On their part, the
government and the central bank is now pressuring the banks to make a final and
definitive writing off of all bad loans during the fiscal year ending in March 2002. At
the time of writing, it is hard to appreciate how effective these measures have been.
5. Analysis
5.1 Communalities
Several common factors can be found between the Nordic countries and Japan in
terms of development of their financial crisis. In earlier studies from U.S., credits tend
to be relatively cheap during high growth years because of low unemployment and
growth in disposal income, thus increasing the level of private loans
61. In all three
countries, these features were prominent and resulted in an excess demand for credits
in both corporate and household sectors. However, the story does not end here.
Naturally, it is not surprising that cheap credits have led to a dry-up of funds in the
small, open economies of Sweden and Finland, but it is noteworthy that the same
thing happened also in Japan, which suggests the size of the excess demand for credits
there. The dry-up in domestic credits made both corporations and banks to seek for
alternative ways to obtain funds, which typically meant foreign borrowing. At the
same time, many lenders aimed to increasing their loan market share by actively
looking for both new borrowers and increase the loans that existing borrowers had,
which made the situation even worse. This process was sustained by low real interest
rates, and the authorities’ fear of disturbing the asset markets was greater than the will
to hinder the situation to go out of hand.
Since the crisis, a wave of mergers has taken place both in the Nordic countries as
well as in Japan. Furthermore, new smaller banks have been set up by non-financial
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firms without any previous experience of retail banking
62. Thus, the post-crisis era has
brought about larger entities of banking groups consisting of existing banks and
financial firms. In addition, the entry costs for new actors to enter the banking market
has been lowered.
All three countries are now also endowed with new independent authorities
supervising the financial sector. For Sweden and Finland, this was a direct
consequence of the measures taken during the first year of the crisis. In Japan, the
FSA was not set up until 1998 as a part of the “Big Bang” reform. Since then, all three
supervisors have proven to be tough and independent.
5.2 Differences
There are however a number of notable differences. Firstly and the most apparent
difference of them all is the size of the Nordic countries’ economies, which was and
still is, significantly smaller than the Japanese.
Secondly, and the most important difference is the debt situation of these countries
before the crises of the 1990’s. While Sweden and Finland were net debtors, Japan
was a net creditor. Differences in dependency on the international economy and the
overall macroeconomic situation made the starting point for structural restructuring of
these countries different. Being net debtors and small open economies, the
governments of Sweden and Finland realized early that the need to support the ailing
banks was necessary in order to keep the confidence in the financial sector intact and
avoid runs
63. The situation for Japan was different, where the strong macroeconomic
position might have made the government as well as the financial institutions falsely
confident and secure in the face of increasing credit losses, which eventually caught
them off their guard in 1997.
Thirdly, Sweden and Finland had accomplished to a large extent the liberalization of
their financial markets before their respective crisis occurred, which is another
advantage in overcoming the banking crisis rapidly. The liberalization of the Swedish
and Finnish financial markets helped these countries to clear off the bad loans by
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having an efficient market which was both willing and able to absorb readily the
assets which the asset-management companies sold off. In addition, even though the
liberalization was somewhat ill-timed for the Nordic countries, the infrastructure for
an effective financial sector was already laid out when the crisis was settled, which
helped a rapid revitalization of the domestic financial markets. This is not the case for
Japan, which has initiated financial deregulation as a reaction to a serious crisis in the
financial sector.
Fourthly, the whole bank support program in Sweden was backed by nearly
unanimous parliament and the plans did not meet any substantial opposition in public
opinion either, thus helping the government to a fast conclusion of the banking crisis.
In Finland, the political opposition laid some hinders in the parliament during the
restructuring period. Despite this, and needing somewhat longer time compared to
Sweden, the support process could still be concluded successfully. In Japan, the
experience from the Jusen crisis in mid-1990’s have made the government cautious in
suggesting use of public funds in large-scale restructuring programs of the Nordic
type.
Fifthly, Sweden and Finland have had long traditions in an open relationship between
firms, government and the public. In addition, complete transparency in terms of
bookkeeping has long been a legal requirement. External auditing has long been a
natural part of corporate governance, and required of all major economic
organizations. Japan did not have rules of this kind before the “Big Bang”, and for
being the second largest economy in the world, the lack of certified public
accountants is surprising
64.
5.3 Agility in responding to the crises
The capability to respond quickly to crises depends on the institutional framework of
the society. In many studies regarding the banking crises in the Nordic countries,
timing and speed of the bank support has been raised as a crucial factor in bringing an
economy back on track after a banking crisis
65. Sweden and Finland acted fast,
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although the first stage was not a part of any planned or carefully measured policy,
but rather a panic reaction to a situation perceived at the time as one that threatened to
get out of control. This picture is supported by how the first reactions were: in
Finland, the central bank rapidly stepped in and instantly assumed control over a
major defaulting bank and in Sweden, the government quickly made a proclamation
of a general guarantee to all depositors. Later, the commitments of the Swedish and
Finnish governments were approved by their national parliaments, and special
organizations handling the banking crises were set up.
In retrospective, Sweden was the most successful in handling the crisis among the
Nordic countries. In comparison with Finland, a few factors were in Sweden’s favor.
First, there was a broad political consensus about the measures to take in order to
cleanse the banking system of bad loans. Second, the authority supervising the
restructuring, the Bank Support Authority, was set up from the very beginning as an
authority independent from the Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Sweden. Third,
the role of the new authority was clearly spelled out in its statutes. Thus, the
responsibility of all the administrative institutions such as the government, the
parliament, the Ministry of Finance, the Bank of Sweden and the Bank Support
Authority was clearly set.
Considering that the Japanese crisis was developing at the same time as its Nordic
counterpart, one need to ask oneself why the Swedish and Finnish governments were
so fast in responding to their crises compared to the Japanese government. One
answer is the more acute situation in Sweden and the Finland at that time, because of
their size and nature of the economy. Being net debtors to the outside world and
depending on exports, Sweden and Finland were vulnerable to sudden revaluation of
asset markets and currency crises. The threat to the whole financial system of their
countries were very concrete to governments, financial actors and the public, and it
was necessary to make rapid moves in order to preserve the confidence in the system.
Besides not being net debtors, the situation after the burst of the “bubble” was
certainly the same in Japan as it were in Sweden and Finland, but still the Japanese
authorities' response to the crisis has been surprisingly slow. From an earlier example,
we know that the two financial supervisors, Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance,
were aware of the development of a “bubble” in the 1980's. However, before 199828
when a new central banking law was introduced, Bank of Japan was not as
independent as it formally is now. According to the central banking law at the time,
which was introduced in 1942, the role of Bank of Japan was to "further the economic
interest of the country"
66. Since the governor of the central bank was responsible to
the Ministry of Finance and not to the parliament, it is no exaggeration to say that the
World War Two central banking law made Bank of Japan more or less dependent on
the will of the bureaucrats at the Ministry of Finance. Therefore, it is better to ask why
the powerful Ministry of Finance, which had a central role in the Japanese
administration as the coordinator of government's policy, did not take any serious
measures. Having both the power and the resources, the ministry could have taken
decisive steps to cool down the overheated Japanese economy. Instead, they choose
weak measures, maybe in fear of the consequences a drastic tightening would have on
stock and real estate markets – and in the end, the stock portfolios of the banks
67.
The timing and the nature of the measures eventually taken by the government were
exceptionally bad. Realizing that a “bubble” was developing, the interest rates were
increased continuously by the Bank of Japan between 1989 and 1990. At the same
time, in 1990, the Ministry of Finance imposed a weak regulation on real estate
lending
68. On top of this, a new land value tax was introduced in 1991 in order to
moderate the land price increases
69. All these measures, however, did not curb the
pace of lending to the real estate sector, and for some years, the speculation activities
continued, however on a smaller scale compared to the peak year of 1987. There were
also no public signs of any credit troubles in the financial sector.
Another clue can be found in the incentives for city banks to cover their credits. As
we have seen, the privileged position of this type of bank had at the Bank of Japan led
to a situation where the banks could grant industrial loans and get the money from the
central bank
70. This was a form of government subsidy to the banks, and could have
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been interpreted by the banks as an implicit bank guarantee. Ozawa (1999) has
described the view held by the city banks and the Ministry of Finance as
71:
“[...] there was no possibility of bank failure, as far as major keiretsu banks were
concerned; they were strategically too significant to fail.”
In this view, the reluctance of the authorities to intervene early and decisively in the
bank sector can be comprehendible – the Ministry of Finance did not want to interfere
too much in order to protect the banks, and trusted (or hoped) the banks to clean up
the bad loan mess in due course by themselves.
6. Conclusions
An interesting question here is whether the financial crises in Sweden and Finland
really were a result of the deregulations in the 1980's, while very much of the same
phenomena could be observed in Japan where the financial crisis developed without
any large-scale deregulation.
Three factors influencing the Nordic and Japanese banking crises can be raised.
•  Cheap loans
-  Rather than the liberalization itself, the availability of cheap loans during
an economic boom seems to have fostered the banking crises under study
in this paper. In real terms, the credits were cheap in all three countries.
Sweden and Finland had generous deductibility rules for interest payments
and relatively high inflation, while Japan had extreme overliquidity, which
led to lending rates that was perceived as cheap by borrowers.
•  Bad governance by firms and authorities
-  The corporate governance of the banks in Sweden, Finland and Japan
during the 1980’s proved to be exceptionally bad. In fight for increased
market shares, the striving for increased lending volumes overshadowed
ordinary risk assessment. Furthermore, the bad timing of policy measures
in the Nordic countries and the failure of supervising authorities in all
three countries to take proper action before the crisis emerged also fostered
the process towards a banking crisis.
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•  External shock and its impact
-  Various external shocks affected the three countries negatively. Sweden
experienced a major currency crisis, which also hit Finland. The
disintegration of USSR and the sudden end of the important COMECON
trade also had a significant negative impact on the Finnish economy. For
Japan, the Asian Crisis revealed one of the most costly banking crises in its
history.
Even if the situation in Japan is disregarded, it is apparent that macroeconomic factors
in combination with practices or corporate governance within the individual firms are
prominent factors in explaining the causes for the crises. The liberalization was an
important factor in the development of the crisis, but only so after the timing of events
is taken into consideration. Introduced during a high growth period, the liberalization
helped the economy to put in top gear instead of making it more efficient. However,
there are no doubts whether liberalization is needed or not. Rather, timing is important
and it is therefore important to emphasize the long-term effects of a deregulation
instead of the short-term effects.
For Japan, the banking crisis turned into a time bomb that needed an external shock
like the Asian Crisis to go off. Much owing to the strong macroeconomic performance
of the country, Japan was able to survive the lingering banking crisis until 1997. Japan
was a net lender to the outside world, and had accumulated vast amount of reserves
during the years of strong economic growth. The contemporary view seemed to be to
"wait out" the recession, and live on the reserves until the economy picked up the
pace again. This can explain why the authorities were reluctant to take any serious
measures, and trusted the existing financial regulatory system to continue to be a
support rather than a hindrance to an economic recovery.
It is apparent that the weaknesses of the institutionalized control mechanisms in Japan
for organizations both on government level as well as firm level have had important
influence on speed in taking proper action in time. Maybe, it is to a certain extent
possible to blame the crisis on bad luck. But it is equally important to ask whether the
regulatory structure and a piecemeal liberalization can have a role in the drama. The
experiences from the three countries under study in this paper suggest that incentive
structures, good and bad, are important factors in the evolution of these countries’31
banking crises. Equally, making incentives are also important when new structures are
built in order to ensure that the actors on a financial market – financial institutions,
firms, household and supervising authorities alike – can and want to follow the new
rules of the game in a desired manner.
The road Japan has chosen to restructure its economy seems to be one of the most
difficult to enter. Many crucial measures have not been taken in time, or have not
been taken at all. The lack of government intervention and enforcement of a full
disclosure of the credit losses from the 1980’s was a significant mistake made by the
Ministry of Finance and the Bank of Japan. In addition, the close fraternizing by their
supervising officials and the top managers of the financial firms fostered a corruption-
like atmosphere. Taken together, the Japanese people’s confidence in the government
and financial system was badly hurt and the continuing recession caused by low
domestic consumption is only an expression of this lack of confidence.
Specifically from the Swedish experience, we can see that prompt action, backed by
political consensus and setting up of an independent bank support authority operating
under a set of clearly defined rules, seems to be a viable way to vitalize an ailing
banking sector which is burdened by a significant amount of non-performing loans.
However, it would be too easy for Japan just to copy the Fenno-Scandinavian model,
simply for the reason that the will to change was not there from the very beginning,
and it is too late to settle the banking problems in Japan by merely setting up asset-
management companies. It is also necessary to fully implement the “Big Bang”
reforms and take macroeconomic measures of a different kind than those presented so
far by the government. With low levels of consumption, industrial investments,
industrial production, credit crunch and deflation, the conditions have deteriorated so
much that a massive and holistic reform package including the whole economy is a
necessity. The insight of the government to include the whole economy in the reforms
is therefore crucial. This applies also to the opposition parties, which so far have used
the efforts of bank reconstruction by the FRC as a short-term political weapon.
Thus, Japan has no choice but to continue the reform process with further
deregulation of the economy and to continue the cleansing of the slough that the bad
loans constitute. Restoring public confidence in the system is a necessary condition in
order to vitalize the much-needed domestic consumption and the economic recovery.32
The revival of the Japanese economy is not only a problem for Japan, but for all
countries that have claims on Japan and its financial institutions. In other words, the
economic and financial problems in general and the bad loan problems in particular is
indeed a problem not only for Japan, but also for the whole world. Hence it would be
fair to say that Japanese banks are drag anchors of the whole world economy.
Earlier in the history we have seen that financial markets, like an unstably constructed
ship riding on rough waves, turn shaky in an environment of fast economic growth
combined with cheap and easily obtained loans. Regulations fulfilling its purposes
combined with transparent markets and strict supervision by independent authorities
should make markets more efficient and thus lower the cost of raising funds for both
companies and individuals.33
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